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Abstract Although research on Theory-of-Mind (ToM) is
often based on single task measurements, more compre-
hensive instruments result in a better understanding of ToM
development. The ToM Storybooks is a new instrument
measuring basic ToM-functioning and associated aspects.
There are 34 tasks, tapping various emotions, beliefs,
desires and mental-physical distinctions. Four studies on the
validity and reliability of the test are presented, in typically
developing children (n = 324, 3–12 years) and children
with PDD-NOS (n = 30). The ToM Storybooks have good
psychometric qualities. A component analysis reveals five
components corresponding with the underlying theoretical
constructs. The internal consistency, test–retest reliability,
inter-rater reliability, construct validity and convergent
validity are good. The ToM Storybooks can be used in
research as well as in clinical settings.
Keywords Theory-of-Mind  Storybooks  Validation 
Reliability  Normal children  Autism spectrum disorder
Introduction
From the beginning of the last century, research has been
undertaken on the social empathy of children (e.g. But-
terworth and Light 1982; Piaget 1929; Selman 1980).
However, this topic only attracted the full attention of
developmental psychologists after Premack and Woodruff
(1978) introduced the term Theory of Mind in their
chimpanzee research. Under the flag of ‘Theory-of-Mind’
it has become one of the most prolific research areas in
social developmental psychology. Theory-of-Mind (ToM)
is the social cognitive ability to attribute mental states to
oneself and others and to use these attributions in under-
standing, predicting and explaining behavior of others and
oneself (Mitchell 1997). ToM is also referred to as ‘folk
psychological abilities’ or as ‘mind reading skills’. It is a
core human capacity needed to fully understand the social
environment and for showing socially adequate behavior
(Astington and Jenkins 1995).
After the pioneering work of Premack and Woodruff
(1978), research in normal ToM development proceeded
with Wimmer and Perner (1983) who aimed their research
at the understanding of wrong beliefs in young children.
This was soon followed by studies in deviant ToM devel-
opment. Concerning the latter, a great deal of research has
been aimed at children with autism, starting with the studies
of Baron-Cohen et al. (1985). They formulated the
assumption that children with autism lack a ToM and that
this deficit can explain a crucial part of the social impair-
ment of these children. Since then a considerable amount of
research has been undertaken in both typically developing
children and children with autism (for a review see Well-
man et al. 2001; Baron-Cohen 1989, 2000, respectively).
The majority of ToM research in children focuses on the
comprehension of false beliefs. A false belief (FB) is the
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ability of a child to predict the action of a second person,
while the child knows that this second person has an
incorrect belief about the situation. Well-known paradigms
used to test this are the Maxi test, which is an unexpected
transfer test (Wimmer and Perner 1983), and the Smarties
test, which is an unexpected content test (Perner et al.
1987). In the Smarties test, a child has to predict what a
second person will say what is in the Smarties container,
given that the child has seen that a pencil has been put in it
(he holds a true belief) whereas the second person has not
witnessed this (he holds an incorrect belief). Children only
succeed on such tasks if they acknowledge that people act
according to their own beliefs, even if those beliefs are,
according to the child, wrong: the second person will say
that the container holds smarties (and not a pencil).
The mastering of FB is considered to provide stringent
evidence of a mature ToM (Hala and Carpendale 1997). As
a result, the question of how and when children appreciate
FB has moved centre stage in research on social cognitive
development (Russel 2005). In addition, FB comprehen-
sion appears to be a universal milestone that occurs around
the age of four, across different cultures (e.g. Callaghan
et al. 2005; Wellman et al. 2001). However, equating FB
understanding with the possession of a ToM is too sim-
plistic. ToM comprises far more than that, like for instance
the understanding of desires and emotions (Astington
2001). In addition, various ToM precursors are also
involved. Already in the first and second year of life, a
child develops socio-cognitive skills important for later
ToM understanding, such as understanding intentional
actions, engaging in pretend play, joint attention and imi-
tation (e.g. Callaghan et al. 2005; Colonessi 2005).
Lately, the focus of research has moved from specific
FB understanding to a more developmental view (Wellman
and Lagattuta 2000; Steele et al. 2003) aiming at a wide
range of ToM components that children develop between
their second and sixth year (Wellman and Lagattuta 2000).
In this period, ToM evolves from a simple desire theory to
a complete belief-desire theory, from true beliefs to false
beliefs, and from the understanding of first-order beliefs to
second-order beliefs. Which mechanisms underlie this
development remains subject of discussion (for a review,
see Astington and Gopnik 1991; Hala and Carpendale
1997; Leekam 1993) (for a discussion, see Astington 2001;
Scholl and Leslie 2001; Wellman and Cross 2001; Well-
man et al. 2001). Roughly, three viewpoints can be
distinguished: the theory–theory view, the modular view
and the simulation view. The theory–theory view assumes
that the ability to form theories is an innate capacity,
founded on a general learning mechanism. The child learns
through hypothesis testing (Carruthers 1996; Gopnik 2003;
Gopnik and Wellman 1992; Perner 1988, 1991, 1993,
1995; Wellman 1990; Wellman and Bartch 1988). The
modular view assumes that ToM has a specific innate basis,
part of which is modular and which is activated on the basis
of maturation (Baron-Cohen and Ring 1994; Fodor 1983,
1992; German and Leslie 2000; Leslie 1987, 1992, 2000;
Leslie et al. 2004). The simulation view emphasizes the
aspect of putting oneself in another person’s shoes, and
thus of truly ‘empathizing’, which is the ability to recog-
nize, perceive and feel directly the emotion of another
person (Gallese 2007; Gordon 1992, 1996; Harris 1992).
Recently, a rapprochement seems to emerge between the
different views on mindreading abilities, resulting in a
more hybrid position combining both the theory–theory
view and the simulation view (Keysers and Gazzola 2007;
Stueber 2006).
Relatively regardless of the view one holds on the
underlying nature of ToM, the majority of researchers
broadly agree on a number of observable aspects or com-
ponents that constitute ToM knowledge in children. In
deciding which aspects to incorporate in the present study,
we leaned heavily upon the work of Wellman (1990), not
only focusing on core ToM components, like desires and
beliefs, but also on associated aspects, like the recognition
of emotions, perception knowledge and the difference
between physical and mental entities. The result is a
comprehensive test of ToM components and associated
aspects.
Comprehensive ToM Tests
Test psychologists recommend the use of comprehensive
instruments composed of multiple tasks. Since aggregation
favors broader applicability and reliability, such instru-
ments can reduce standard errors and make measurements
more reliable and valid. The total score of such a test is a
compound score; that is, a score built of different parts.
Research on ToM has shown that compound scores are
more stable, because they average over multiple factors
and lead to a more accurate measurement of the underlying
skill (Hughes et al. 2000). In using such scores, a more
adequate diagnostic procedure might be attained, which
can help in studying the potential nature and causes of ToM
differences in children (Hughes and Dunn 1998). In addi-
tion to providing a single, quantitative measure of the level
of ToM ability, it also allows investigators to compare
different relevant ToM components or aspects in the same
child and thus to discover how these aspects are related
during the course of development.
In current research on ToM, such comprehensive tests
are seldom used (for exceptions, e.g. Happe´ 1994; Tager-
Flusberg 2003; Wellman and Liu 2004). On the contrary,
most research is based on single task measurements
involving single aspects of ToM. These assessments may
be quick and efficient, but provide no information about the
1908 J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930
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nature and coherence of different aspects of ToM, and the
stability of ToM ability over time. Examples of compre-
hensive ToM tests are the ToM battery of Happe´ (1994),
the Tom-Test of Steerneman and colleagues (Steerneman
et al. 2002; Muris et al. 1999), the ToM tasks of Tager-
Flusberg (2003), and the ToM tasks of Wellman and Liu
(2004). The first three comprehensive tests incorporate
both simple and more advanced aspects of ToM. The ToM
battery of Happe´ (1994) incorporates first-order-belief
tasks, first-order deception tasks; second-order-belief tasks
and second-order deception tasks. The ToM tasks of Tager-
Flusberg (2003) consist of three batteries tapping early
(pretend and desire), middle (perception/knowledge, loca-
tion-change FB, unexpected-contents FB and sticker
hiding) and more advanced ToM aspects (second-order-
belief, lies and jokes, traits and moral commitment). The
Tom-Test (Steerneman et al. 2002; Muris et al. 1999)
consists of three subscales tapping ToM precursors (e.g.,
recognition of emotions and pretense), first manifestations
of a real ToM (e.g., first-order-belief and FB) and more
advanced ToM aspects (e.g., second-order-belief and
humor). The last comprehensive test, the ToM tasks of
Wellman and Liu (2004), confines itself to simple ToM
tasks only. The tasks tap various desires, diverse beliefs,
knowledge access, content FB, explicit FB, belief emotion
and real-apparent emotion.
The ToM Storybooks
Many ToM tests are aimed at testing school-aged children.
However, ToM-problems often occur long before this age,
as the CHAT (CHecklist for Autism in Toddlers; Baron-
Cohen et al. 1992) and M-CHAT (Modified CHAT, Robins
et al. 2001) illustrate by identifying potential ToM prob-
lems at the age of 18 months on. We did not have the
intention to measure ToM functioning from this age on, but
wanted to develop a comprehensive test that can be used to
assess basic ToM functioning in an age range that is as
wide as possible. The aspects we aim at are ToM aspects
that normally develop in the preschool years, but that also
show further refinements during the school age period.
Therefore, in accordance with Wellman and Liu (2004), we
decided not to include second-order-belief tasks or other
more advanced ToM aspects. At the time of the instrument
building, the test of Wellman and Liu had not yet been
published; in contrast to the ToM battery of Happe´ and the
ToM-test of Steerneman and colleagues. Since the latter
two tests were considered too complex to be used in pre-
school children, we developed a new test, the ToM
Storybooks. In the 2002 paper from the current authors
(Serra et al. 2002) a preliminary version of the test was
presented. The following requirements were set for the
final version: the test must comprise a wide and
representative range of ToM components, cover a broad
age range in order to allow for direct comparisons between
children of different ages based on a continuous develop-
mental trajectory and, finally, be optimally accessible and
attractive to the youngest age range in particular, since that
is the age range where the most rapid developments in
ToM occur.
In this paper, we present four studies on the validity and
reliability of the ToM Storybooks. The first study presents
the construction of the new ToM Storybooks. The second
study is aimed at the content validity of the test. The third
study addresses the reliability of the test. Is the internal
consistency of the test items sufficiently high? Are mea-
surements repeatable, what is the test–retest reliability?
What is the correspondence between raters evaluating the
answers of children? The fourth study is aimed at the
construct validity of the test. Is there convergent validity;
does this test correlate highly with other tests that are
known to measure ToM? As regards divergent validity: do
the results obtained with this test differ sufficiently from
tests not aimed at ToM, like an intelligence test and a
language test? Since research has already shown that ToM
results correlate positively with verbal intelligence scores
(e.g. Hughes et al. 1999) and language scores (de Villiers
2000; Happe´ 1995; Tager-Flusberg 2000), we expect the
test to show a positive correlation with language and
IQ-tests.
An important question regarding the validity of the ToM
Storybooks is whether the test is able to distinguish typi-
cally developing children, from children with autism
spectrum disorders. A related question is whether the
results regarding validity and reliability obtained with
typically developing children also hold for the children
with autism spectrum disorders. The latter group is known
to have ToM problems (Buitelaar et al. 1999; Dissanayake
and Macintosh 2003; Hill and Frith 2004; Serra et al. 2002;
Yirmiya et al. 1998). We aimed to test children with PDD-
NOS. If the test is able to distinguish the ToM functioning
of children with PDD-NOS from that of typically devel-
oping children, it is by definition also suitable for
distinguishing children with more severe impairments in
ToM functioning, for instance children with a more severe
pervasive disorder like an autistic disorder.
Study 1: Development of the ToM Storybooks
We wanted to develop a comprehensive ToM test that
assesses a variety of ToM components and associated
aspects, which develop during the preschool years and
also tend to further refine and increase during the early
school years. The construction of the test is explained
below.
J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930 1909
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Setting and Participants
We tested 324 typically developing children that came
from preschools, kindergartens and elementary schools. All
children had a Dutch linguistic background, and did not
have any language acquisition problems that could have
hampered their performance on the ToM tasks (for the
effect of language on ToM performance see for instance
Garfield et al. 2001; Lohmann and Tomasello 2003). Two
Dutch language tests were used, depending on the age of
the child. For 3–6 year olds, the Reynell was administered
(test for receptive language comprehension; Van Eldik
et al. 1997); and for 6–9 year olds, the TvK (Taaltest voor
Kinderen, Language Test for Children; Van Bon 1982) was
used (subtests ‘vocabulary’ and ‘sentence construction’).
Language scores were available for 249 children (Reynell:
n = 170, TvK: n = 79). Those children who did not
receive a language test were older than 6 years and judged
as having appropriate language skills by their teachers.
The sample consisted of 157 girls and 167 boys. The
ages ranged from three up to and including 11 years (see
Table 1 for the age distribution). Because the most rapid
changes in ToM occur before the age of 5 years, there is an
overrepresentation of young children.1
Construction of the ToM Storybooks
Different Components
Primarily based on Wellman’s work (1990), core ToM
components like desires and beliefs were included, but also
emotions and associated aspects like the distinction
between physical and mental entities, and understanding
that seeing leads to knowing were included.
Emotion recognition is an important aspect, since dis-
criminating and labeling facial expression of emotions lay
the foundation for the ability to respond empathically to
others (Feshbach 1982). By the end of the first year, typi-
cally developing children respond differently to facial
expressions of emotion in others (Baron-Cohen 1994). At
20 months they use emotion words like happy, angry, sad,
and scared (Flavell et al. 1993). At 3 years, they under-
stand desire-based emotions (Yuill 1984), and at 5 years
belief-based emotions (Hadwin and Perner 1991).
Beliefs and desires are considered core components of
ToM. At 1.5 years children understand that other people
have desires (Repacholi and Gopnik 1997); at 2.5 years
they have a desire theory (Wellman and Woolley 1990); at
3 years a simple desire belief theory, they understand first-
order beliefs (Bartsch 1996; Wellman 1990; Wimmer and
Perner 1983), and at 4 years a complete belief desire theory
is established (Wellman 1990). Four-year-olds have a
representational understanding of beliefs (Gopnik 1993;
Gopnik and Astington 1988; Perner 1991). Finally, 4-year-
olds can distinguish true and false beliefs (Hala and Car-
pendale 1997; Wellman 1990; Wimmer and Perner 1983).
Concerning the associated aspects, during their second
year children comprehend the difference between physical
and mental entities (Wellman 1990). At 3 years, they
understand that seeing leads to knowing (Astington and
Gopnik 1991; Pillow 1989; Pratt and Bryant 1990).
The tasks used in the ToM Storybooks are based on
tasks from former research. In Table 2, an overview can be
found of the origin of the tasks. The different components
are ordered by the age children are able to successfully
accomplish such tasks.
Task Structure
We developed 34 tasks in total. Task examples can be
found in Appendix A. The order of tasks and the number of
questions per task are described in Appendix B.
Storybook Structure
The 34 tasks follow each other in a natural way; they are
interwoven in stories. The stories feature a main protago-
nist, named Sam. A coherent drawing style was used (for
instance, Sam always wears the same cloths). Each task is
illustrated with a full color picture. The drawings are
enlivened by the use of toy doors that can be opened,
magnetic emotion faces that can be placed on the charac-
ters, and patches of soft fur that can be caressed, if wanted.2
Transitions between tasks are also accompanied by draw-
ings and text, to keep the story going and to avoid too much
switching between tasks.
Table 1 Distribution in age groups of the typically developing
children
Age (in years)
3 4 5 6 7 8–9 10–11 Total
Boys 32 31 31 31 15 14 13 167
Girls 29 24 32 26 16 12 18 157
All 61 55 63 57 31 26 31 324
1 Also children older than 5 years were tested, in order to determine
the upper-age limit of the test. In addition, testing older children
makes comparisons between children with and without ToM prob-
lems easier.
2 Non-graphical elements are distributed sparsely across the text;
manipulation of these elements is not a necessary condition for
answering the test. None of the children from clinical populations to
which the test has been administered so far has shown any sign of
disturbance or aversion for the non-graphical elements.
1910 J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930
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There are six storybooks in total: How is Sam feeling?,
Sam goes to the park, Sam goes swimming, Sam visits his
grandparents, Sam at the farm, and Sam’s birthday. The
order in which the six books are presented to the child is
partly fixed and partly variable. The administration starts
with the book ‘How is Sam feeling?’ and finishes with the
book ‘It’s Sam’s birthday’. The order of the other four
books is chosen by the child. By offering this choice, we
intend to involve the child more in the testing, increasing
the child’s commitment and motivation. The four books
can be considered parallel tests: they have an identical
underlying structure and correlations between the different
books are high (see Table 3).
Although we conceive of the storybooks featuring the
character Sam as the default version of our ToM test, three
additional versions of the test were developed, based on
different protagonists. They are designed to be used in a
time-serial design, preventing trivial learning effects that
might result from mere repetition. In the present article, we
will confine ourselves to the default version of the test,
featuring Sam.
Testing Procedure
The test takes 40–50 min, including a short break. The
child sits at the left side of the administrator, so it can see
the drawings clearly (the drawings are on the left side of
the book, while the accompanying text for the
experimenter can be found on the right side). The drawings
remain in front of the child during the questioning in order
to prevent mistakes due to memory requirements (in
agreement with Charman et al. 2001).
Scoring Procedure
Scoring Items
The 34 tasks consist of 95 questions, namely 77 ‘test
questions’ and 18 ‘justification questions’ in total. The test
questions (for instance, Where will Sam look for his roll-
erblades? In the toy trunk or in the box?), can be
considered a quick and less thorough method of testing,
since they do not require justifications from a child. The
answers to these questions are coded as correct or incorrect
(1 or 0 points; maximum score = 77). Because justifica-
tions are considered to better reflect the ToM knowledge of
a child, most tasks also include such questions. Justification
questions (for instance, Why will Sam look in the box?)
result in 2, 1 or 0 points, depending on the correctness of
the mental state terms spontaneously used by the child
(maximum score = 36) (for the scoring procedure see the
right four columns of Appendix B).
In order to enable the standardized evaluation of the
justifications, a category system has been developed, based
on the category system used by Rieffe (1998), on different
categories from Wellman (1990), and on an exploration of
the empirical data (the elaborate category system can be
requested from author EB). Two rules of thumb are fol-
lowed in scoring the justifications. First, a justification can
only be scored if the preceding test question is answered
correctly. Second, the correctness of categories varies over
the different types of questions. For instance, a desire
answer can only be considered a correct category if it was
used within a desire task and not within a FB task.
Table 2 Origin of tasks used in the ToM Storybooks, ordered by age
Age Sort of task Task based on research from Comparison with other comprehensive
ToM tests
1 Emotion recognition Pons and Harris (2000) Steerneman et al. (2002)
2 Desire resulting in action or
emotion
Bartsch and Wellman (1989); Wellman (1990); Wellman
and Bartsch (1988); Wellman and Wooley (1990)
Tager-Flusberg (2003); Wellman and Liu
(2004)
3 Mental physical distinction
(including close
impostors)
Wellman (1990); Wellman and Estes (1986) Steerneman et al. (2002)
3 Perception knowledge Baron-Cohen and Goodhart (1994); Pratt and Bryant
(1990)
Tager-Flusberg (2003)
3–4 Belief resulting in action or
emotion
Bartsch and Wellman (1989); Wellman (1990); Wellman
and Bartsch (1988); Wellman and Wooley (1990)
Steerneman et al. (2002); Wellman and Liu
(2004)
4–5 First-order false belief Perner et al. (1987); Steerneman et al. (2002); Tager-
Flusberg (2003); Wimmer and Perner (1983)
Happe´ (1994); Steerneman et al. (2002);
Tager-Flusberg (2003); Wellman and Liu
(2004)
Table 3 Correlations between the four parallel books within the
ToM storybooks
Book 3 Book 4 Book 5
Book 2 0.67 0.79 0.74
Book 3 0.72 0.74
Book 4 0.77
J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930 1911
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Therefore, for each justification question, correct answer
categories are determined. They are chosen from 21 for-
mulated justification categories; in Appendix C definitions
of these categories can be found.
ToM sumscore as an estimation of ToM ability. To
assess the properties of the test items in estimating the ToM
ability, a one-parameter logistic model (OPLM; Verhelst
et al. 1995) was used. The key idea in OPLM, a unidi-
mensional Item Response Model, is that for each item the
probability of responding correctly to the item can be
described by a particular monotonic increasing function of
ToM ability. In OPLM, the particular functions of the items
may differ in the item location (some ToM items are more
difficult to master than others), and in the item discrimi-
nation (some items discriminate children better in their
ToM ability than others). For the justification questions,
with three response categories (2 points, 1 point or 0 point),
a polytomous OPLM was used.
The OPLM showed a good fit for the 95 ToM items (77
test questions + 18 justification questions), except for the
three items of the inferred belief control task. For those
items, a higher ToM ability did not result in a higher
probability of giving a correct answer. Therefore, those
items were eliminated from the ToM test. The OPLM of the
92 remaining items revealed a good fit for all items. All
items contribute significantly to estimating the ToM ability.
The correlation between OPLM ToM ability estimate and
the ToM sumscore was 0.99. Thus, the ToM sumscore and
the OPLM ToM ability estimate yield approximately the
same results for ordering the children on their ToM ability.
Therefore, we confine ourselves to a ToM sumscore;
weighted values are not required. The testing with the ToM
Storybooks results in a maximum total score of 110 points
(ToM-total score), consisting of a maximum of 74 points for
answers to the ‘test questions’ (3 inferred belief control
questions are excluded) and a maximum of 36 points
(= 18 9 2) for answers to the ‘justification questions’.
ToM Quotient Score
In addition to a total score, a ToM quotient score (ToMQ)
can be calculated. Norms for the ToM sumscores were
obtained by applying a non-linear smoothing method over
the raw data. Smoothness of the estimated curve is induced
by weighing neighbouring observed scores (see for
instance Simonoff 1996; Ha¨rdle 1991). A Fourier-series
tenth-order polynomial based on a Loess smoothing tech-
nique (locally weighted least squares estimate) has been
applied, which enables us to calculate the conversion
curve. This curve enables us to determine the value of the
smoothed curve at any possible age between 3 and
11 years. The conversion curve was calculated with the
help of the TableCurve 2D programme (Systat 2000).
Raw ToM sumscores were converted to Z-scores and
converted to quotient scores (Wechsler 1981). This is a
standardized normed score, with an average of 100 and a
standard deviation of 15 (for more details on the norming
procedure of the ToM Storybooks, we refer to Blijd-Ho-
ogewys et al. submitted).
Conclusion
The ToM Storybooks have been developed with the aim of
providing practitioners and researchers with a compre-
hensive ToM test assessing different basic ToM
components and associated aspects. The test was admin-
istered to typically developing children.
The test consists of 34 tasks divided over six storybooks.
It holds 74 test questions and 18 justification questions,
resulting in a maximum total score of 110. The ToM
sumscore can be considered a good estimation of ToM
ability, as the OPLM results illustrated. Weighted values
are not required. Also, a ToM quotient score can be
calculated.
As far as typically developing children are concerned,
the test focuses on the age range between three and six,
given the rapid developments of ToM that occur in this
period. However, the test has standardized norms and is
applicable up to the age of 12. As a result, an 11-year-old
child with ToM problems can be compared to a typically
developing 5-year-old but also to a typically developing
11-year-old. Thus, the test is particularly suited for studies
requiring age comparisons, based on the same instrument
(e.g. cross-sectional research, assessment of clinical pop-
ulations at various ages).
Criteria for Subgrouping
Since ToM evolves over time, one expects the ToM total
scores to increase with age. There is indeed a significant
positive correlation between ToM total score and chrono-
logical age in the NT group (N = 324, r = 0.76,
p \ 0.001) (see Table 4 for the ToM total scores over age).
The dependence of the scores on age poses a number of
problems for the analyses of reliability and validity. Hence,
where needed, analyses were carried taking into account an
age correction or by using distinct age groups. In the group
of 324 typically developing children, we distinguished
three age groups. The subdivisions were made based on
theoretical expectations (expected levels of ToM func-
tioning: low level, intermediate level and master level) and
pragmatic grounds (approximate equal groups). The
youngest (n = 87; 3–4.5 years old) represents the age at
which ToM development is at its beginning, at least as
measured with the ToM Storybooks. The eldest (n = 118;
1912 J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930
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6.5–11 years old) represents the age at which the ToM
aspects measured with the ToM Storybooks is expected
to have consolidated. The fastest growth of ToM is
expected to occur in the intermediate age group (n = 119;
4.5–6.5 years old).
Because this article discusses different psychometric
studies, each with different sub-studies, we enclose an
overview of the statistical analyses performed and their
results (see Table 9). These results are discussed in more
detail below.
Study 2: Content Validity
Our test, the ToM Storybooks consists of different tasks on
ToM components and associated aspects taken from liter-
ature. It contains tasks aimed at assessing five subtypes of
abilities, namely emotion recognition, understanding of
desires and beliefs, making the distinction between physi-
cal and mental entities, and seeing leads to knowing
(compare Appendix A). To assess whether those subtypes
are indeed present, a component analysis was performed.
We expected the subtypes to be correlated, and the
correlation to depend on age. That is, the degree of dif-
ferentiation is expected to be the largest at ages where ToM
has rapid growth. Less differentiation, and hence greater
correlations between subtypes, is to be expected in early
stages of ToM.
Subjects and Method
The analyses were based on the 324 typically developing
children from Study 1. We calculated composite variables
for the ToM Storybooks: for the different tasks, means
were calculated over theoretically similar items. This
resulted in 21 composite variables (between brackets are
the number of test questions + number of justification
questions) (for example of the tasks see Appendix A):
emotion recognition (5 + 0) and emotion naming (5 + 2)
(parts from the emotion recognition tasks); desire action
(3 + 1), desire emotion recognition (5 + 1), and desire
emotion naming (5 + 0) (parts from the desire tasks);
standard belief emotion recognition (2 + 0), standard
belief emotion naming (2 + 1), standard belief action
(3 + 1), changed belief action (1 + 1), not own belief
action (1 + 1), not belief action (2 + 1), inferred belief
(control) action (4 + 0), and (explicit) FB action (5 + 2)
(parts from the belief tasks); mental physical senses
(8 + 2), mental physical others (4 + 1), mental physical
future (4 + 1), real imaginary (7 + 0), close impostor
senses (4 + 0), close impostor others (2 + 1), and close
impostor future (2 + 1) (parts from tasks aimed at the
distinction between physical and mental entities); and
finally, the variable seeing-is-knowing (1 + 1).
Statistical Analysis
The scores of the three age groups (group 1: n = 87,
3–4.5 years old; group 2: n = 119, 4.5–6.5 years old; and
group 3: n = 118; 6.5–11 years old) were analyzed using a
simultaneous component analysis with equal pattern (SCA-
P; Kiers and Ten Berge 1994). SCA-P, which is a variant of
principal component analysis, estimates one pattern matrix
for all three groups. As a result, the interpretation of the
components (or factors) is equal for all groups, but the
correlations between components and standard deviations
of the component scores can differ across groups. To
determine the number of components, the scree-test (Cat-
tell 1966), the eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule (Kaiser
1960), and the substantive meaning of components, was
used. Only minimum loadings of 0.400 were considered.
Finally, composite variables had to show adequate speci-
ficity for their components. Subsequently, internal
consistency reliability was calculated for the components
found.
Results
The scree plot of the SCA-P did not give a clear indication for
five components. The eigenvalue-greater-than-one rule
indicated that seven components should be retained. We
established the number of components on the basis of the
substantive content of the components, determining whether
increasing the number of factors still allowed the items of a
factor to measure a clinical concept. A solution consisting of
five components provided the best interpretation. This
solution accounted for 53.8% of the variance. The pattern
Table 4 ToM total scores over age
Age Number Average ToM score
Test Justification Total
3 27 36.30 (8.06) 0.11 (0.42) 36.41 (8.07)
3.5 34 43.09 (10.30) 0.50 (1.11) 43.59 (10.97)
4 26 51.69 (9.55) 5.42 (6.18) 57.12 (14.32)
4.5 29 55.28 (7.38) 6.55 (4.59) 61.83 (10.89)
5 30 57.70 (7.28) 7.33 (4.16) 65.03 (10.46)
5.5 33 82.88 (6.29) 10.88 (4.75) 73.76 (9.95)
6 27 62.04 (7.49) 11.07 (5.52) 73.11 (12.21)
6.5 30 60.80 (6.94) 10.17 (3.97) 70.97 (9.96)
7 31 67.39 (4.74) 15.71 (4.23) 83.10 (7.84)
8 + 9 26 69.56 (4.36) 16.80 (4.49) 86.36 (7.96)
10 + 11 31 70.39 (4.53) 18.17 (4.28) 88.56 (7.71)
Note. Average ToM scores and corresponding standard deviations are
reported
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matrix was rotated using the oblique Promax rotation
criterion. The resulting structure matrix revealed a reason-
ably simple structure of five components (see Table 5)
component 1 = belief action; component 2 = emotion
recognition; component 3 = mental physical; component
4 = belief emotion; and component 5 = desire emotion.
Two composite variables (from the original 21 formulated)
also had loadings on other components, not being entirely
specific, namely the composite variables ‘mental physical
senses’ and ‘close impostor future’. Two other composite
variables did not fit this structure, namely desire action and
seeing-is-knowing. The correlations between the compo-
nents varied from 0.248 to 0.454 (see Table 5).
Cronbach alphas, corrected for age, for these five
components were calculated: component 1 (10 items,
a = 0.79), component 2 (4 items, a = 0.47), component 3
(9 items, a = 0.80), component 4 (25 items, a = 0.62) and
component 5 (14 items, a = 0.61). Since the scores on the
justification items depended on the child’s answer on the
related dichotomous items, justification items were not
included in the calculation of the alphas, in order to avoid
artifacts.
To assess the degree of differentiation in the three age
groups, inter-factor correlations between the five compo-
nents were computed within the three age groups. The
correlations between the components were largest in the
youngest group (average correlations, standard deviations
of the correlations: M = 0.47, SD = 0.08), and compara-
ble in the intermediate age group (M = 0.26, SD = 0.013)
and in the eldest group (M = 0.26, SD = 0.15).





method, Promax with Kaizer
Normalization
Note. Correlations \0.400 and
[-0.400 were omitted
(A) Structure matrix with correlations between 5 components and 21 composite variables
Component
1 2 3 4 5
Emotion recognition 0.926
Emotion naming 0.924
Standard belief emotion recognition 0.833
Standard belief emotion naming 0.831
Desire action 0.418
Desire emotion recognition 0.944
Desire emotion naming 0.956
Mental physical senses 0.459 0.669 0.494
Mental physical others 0.570
Mental physical future 0.455
Close impostor senses 0.682
Close impostor others 0.520
Close impostor future 0.475 0.523
Real imaginary 0.460
Seeing-is-knowing
Standard belief action 0.772
Changed belief action
(Explicit) false belief action 0.430
Not own belief action 0.807
Not belief action 0.820
Inferred belief (control) action 0.683
(Explicit) FB action 0.560
(B) Component correlation matrix




4 0.388 0.291 0.388
5 0.248 0.294 0.322 0.267
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Conclusion
The component analysis resulted in a structure that largely
corresponds with the underlying theoretical constructs from
the test. The five components appeal to the five subtypes of
abilities named in Appendix A) except for the composite
variable ‘seeing leads to knowing’ which did not appear as
a separate component. This is not surprising, since the
composite variable consists of too few questions (only
two). The internal consistency reliability is satisfying
(although some Cronbach alphas are not [0.70), since it
concerns alphas on subparts of the test each containing a
limited number of items, that are also corrected for age.
The inter-factor correlations are consistent with the
expectations: they are high in the youngest children
implying that ToM abilities are not (yet) differentiated.
Study 3: Reliability
In order to examine the reliability of the ToM Storybooks,
we calculated the internal test consistency, test–retest
reliability and inter-rater reliability. In addition, we
examined the possibility of diminished test performance
due to nuisance factors such as fatigue or boredom.
Subjects and Method
For the internal test consistency, the data of the 324 typi-
cally developing children from Study 1 were used. For the
test–retest reliability, a subgroup of 45 typically developing
children (age 3–7) was tested again, with the second
administration occurring 2–3 weeks later. We presume that
ToM ability remains relatively constant when reassessed
after such a short period. The test–retest reliability was also
measured for children with PDD-NOS (n = 18; age 5–9) (a
subgroup from the clinical group that will be presented in
Study 4, see Table 7), with the second administration after
1 week. In order to determine the inter-rater reliability of
the justifications, the test results of a subsample of 10
children were randomly chosen from both research groups
(n = 10 typically developing children and n = 10 children
with PDD-NOS). For the analysis of possible diminishing
test performance at the end of the test, the data of the 324
typically developing children was used.
Statistical Analyses
The internal consistency was established by means of a
Cronbach’s alpha. The test–retest reliability was estab-
lished by means of a Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient. The inter-rater reliability was calculated on the
basis of Cohen’s kappa’s. Five independent raters scored
the justifications and the correlations between these five
raters were calculated. This was done in two manners: a
flexible manner by points awarded to the justifications
(2, 1 or 0 points) (compare Appendix B) and a stringent
manner by justification category chosen (compare
Appendix C). To examine whether the test scores were
affected by nuisance factors such as fatigue or boredom, it
was checked if the results over the various storybooks
showed a significant decline. Books 2–5 were considered,
because they have a similar item structure (see Study 1).
Since children could choose the order of the books, the
average total score of the actual presentation of those
books were compared. If nuisance played a part, the last
presented book should result in a lower score than the first
presented book.
Results
The internal consistency of the ToM Storybooks was good.
After correction for the influence of age, Cronbach’s alpha
for the dichotomous items was 0.90. The test–retest reli-
ability for the typically developing children was good
(M1 ToM-total score = 59.91, SD1 = 18.46 versus M2
ToM-total score = 66.76, SD2 = 19.73; r = .86, p \
0.001). The children’s scores rose significantly on the
second administration (M = 6.84, SD = 10.33; paired
samples t-test, p \ 0.001). The test–retest reliability for the
children with PDD-NOS was also good (M1 ToM-total
score = 80.22, SD1 = 14.37 versus M2 ToM-total
score = 79.67, SD2 = 15.67; r = 0.98, no significant dif-
ference). The inter-rater reliability was high (Cohen’s
Kappa = 0.97–0.99 for the 0–2 points awarded, 0.81–0.97
for the 21 categories). Concerning nuisance effects, no
statistically significant decrease in total scores per book
were found during the test administration; this applied for
the total group as well as for the three separate age groups
separately (for test performance from beginning to end of
testing, see Table 6).
Table 6 Test performance
from beginning to end of testing
Note. Mean scores per book and
standard deviations are depicted
Book 2 Book 3 Book 4 Book 5
Age group 1 (3–4.5 years) 9.07 (3.37) 8.79 (3.38) 8.76 (3.45) 8.70 (2.85)
Age group 2 (4.5–6.5 years) 12.78 (3.44) 13.02 (2.57) 13.00 (2.97) 13.06 (3.55)
Age group 3 (6.5–11 years) 15.48 (3.25) 15.60 (2.41) 15.84 (2.89) 15.82 (3.01)
Total group 12.77 (4.19) 12.83 (3.84) 12.90 (4.15) 12.89 (4.24)
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Conclusion
Based on the minimum standard for reliability of 0.70
(Nunnally and Bernstein 1994, p. 265), the internal con-
sistency (Cronbach’s a = 0.90) of the total score was good
(0.90). This is an adequate value for a test aimed at young
children and is consistent with findings from comparable
research on standard and complex FB tasks (Hughes et al.
1999, 2000 obtained alphas of 0.83–0.84; Muris et al. 1999
obtained alphas of 0.84–0.92) and suggests that the different
tasks measure the same underlying construct. Also, the test–
retest reliability is good, both in typically developing chil-
dren (r = 0.86) and in children with PDD-NOS (r = 0.98).
This is consistent with findings from comparable research
(r = 0.77: Hughes et al. 2000; r = 0.88: Muris et al. 1999).
However, a significant increase in ToM total scores was
found at the second measurement in typically developing
children. Such a rise is not surprising, since it can be
expected that young children learn from being tested (Gri-
gorenko and Sternberg 1998). The average score rise
(M = 6.86, SD = 10.33) is of the same magnitude as those
obtained with most standard psychometric measures on
cognitive skills for young children. For instance, a differ-
ence of six IQ points can also be found in test–retest
research with intelligence tests (e.g. Tellegen et al. 2003). A
similar observation has also been reported in ToM research
in typically developing children (Muris et al. 1999). The
children with PDD-NOS did not show such a rise. They
seemed not to have learned from their former experience.
This finding may form an important point of attention in
evaluating children with suspected ToM problems.
The inter-rater reliability of scoring the justifications is
high (Cohen’s Kappa [0.80, namely 0.81–0.97, even
concerning the more stringent scoring criterion) (see also
Charman et al. 2001; Muris et al. 1999). There were no
differences in difficulty in judging the justifications of
typically developing children versus children with PDD-
NOS. There was also no evidence for a statistically sig-
nificant negative effect on the test scores due to increasing
fatigue or boredom during the test administration.
Study 4: Construct Validity
We tested both the convergent and divergent validity of the
ToM Storybooks. Concerning convergent validity, corre-
lations with three similar tests were calculated. Concerning
divergent validity, correlations with language and intelli-
gence tests were calculated. The latter can be considered
moderator variables in performance on ToM tests, but
should not be considered to be equal to ToM. Despite their
diversity, we do expect to find a positive relationship
between ToM scores and scores on a language test, since
ToM questions make a relatively strong appeal to lexical
and syntactic knowledge (see for instance Garfield et al.
2001; Lohmann and Tomasello 2003). We also expect a
positive relationship with verbal IQ (Hughes et al. 1999).
Subjects and Method
Children were referred to an outpatient clinic for child and
adolescent psychiatry. After an extensive psycho-diagnos-
tic and psychiatric examination (which included parent
interviews and play contacts with the child), the children
were diagnosed as having PDD-NOS (pervasive develop-
mental disorder not otherwise specified) according to
DSM-IV criteria (APA 1994).
The clinical group consisted of 30 children with PDD-
NOS. Their ages ranged from four up to and including
8 years (see Table 7). There were 24 boys and 6 girls,
resulting in a sex ratio of 4–1, which is the average sex
ratio found in children with autism (compare Yeargin-
Allsopp et al. 2003).
In order to check the validity of the clinical diagnosis, two
additional tests were administered: the Vineland adaptive
behavior scales (VABS) (Sparrow et al. 1984; Dutch ver-
sion: Researchgroup Developmental Disorders, State
University Leiden, 1995) and the Children’s Social Behavior
Questionnaire (CSBQ; Luteijn et al. 2000; Dutch version:
VISK; Luteijn et al. 2002; Hartman et al. 2007). The VABS
is an interview in which parents are questioned about the
actual social behavior and skills of their child. We used parts
of the expanded form of the VABS. For each child the dis-
crepancy between the Vineland age equivalent (in months)
and the chronological age (in months) was computed
(VA-CA). The results showed that these children had large
and negative discrepancy scores in receptive language,
playing skills, interpersonal relationships and coping skills
(see also Serra et al. 2002) as can be expected in children
with pervasive developmental disorders. Their problems
with expressive language and daily living skills (community)
were less profound (Paul et al. 2004) (compare Table 7).
The parents also filled in the CBSQ. This is a questionnaire in
which parents report autism-related behavior. It can be used
to facilitate selection of PDD samples for research purposes
(Hartman et al. 2006). The CSBQ scores of our group are
comparable to those known for children with HFA and PDD-
NOS (compare Table V in Hartman et al. 2006) (total score,
M = 48, SD = 18; ‘tuned’, M = 10, SD = 5; ‘social’,
M = 13, SD = 5; ‘orientation’, M = 8, SD = 3; ‘under-
standing’, M = 5, SD = 3; ‘stereotyped behavior’, M = 6,
SD = 3; ‘change, M = 2, SD = 2).
Next, all children participated in an extensive psycho-
logical examination which included the assessment of
intelligence (Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-
Revised: Wechsler 1974; Dutch version, 1986) and the level
1916 J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930
123
of language comprehension. Concerning the latter, two
Dutch language tests were used, depending on the age of the
child. For 3–6 year olds, the Reynell was administered (test
for receptive language comprehension; Van Eldik et al.
1997); and for 6–9 year olds, the TvK (Taaltest voor
Kinderen, Language Test for Children; Van Bon 1982) was
used (subtests ‘vocabulary’ and ‘sentence construction’).
Concerning convergent validity, two additional ques-
tionnaires and one test were included. The CSBQ (Luteijn
et al. 2000) measures, among other things, ToM related
knowledge, namely in the subscale ‘difficulties in under-
standing social information’. The VABS questionnaire
(Vineland adaptive behavior scales questionnaire; Frith et al.
1994; Dutch translation: Hoogewys et al. 1999) consists of
32 theoretically derived items aimed at discriminating
between social behaviors for which mentalizing (ToM) is
essential (Interactive Sociability Scale, abbreviated as IS
scale) or not (Active Sociability Scale, abbreviated as AS
scale, concerning social behaviors that can be acquired
without mentalizing). Both CSBQ and VABS questionnaire
were administered for the clinical group (n = 30 PDD-NOS,
4–8 years). Also a second ToM instrument was adminis-
tered, namely the Tom-Test, a Dutch test that questions a
wide variety of ToM aspects (Steerneman et al. 2002; see
also Muris et al. 1999). In contrast with the ToM Storybooks,
it also includes second-order-belief tasks. From the 30 chil-
dren with PDD-NOS, 23 received the Tom-Test (age 4–8).
There were also four groups of typically developing
children involved in Study 4. The first group is a subsample
of 30 control children drawn from the 324 typically devel-
oping children from Study 1. They were matched on age and
gender with the PDD-NOS group. This control group was
used to make comparisons with the clinical group. The sec-
ond is a subsample of 249 typically developing children
(drawn from the group of typically developing children in
Study 1; 3–9 years). For these children, language scores
were available (Reynell: n = 170, TvK: n = 79; 59 boys and
48 girls). This control group was used to explore the rela-
tionship of ToM scores and language scores in typically
developing children. The third is a subsample of 107 typi-
cally developing children (drawn from the 324 typically
developing children in Study 1; 3–7 years). For these chil-
dren, intelligence scores were available. They received a
nonverbal intelligence test. Depending on the age of the child
this consisted of the SON-R 2-7 years (Snijders-Oomen
Nonverbal intelligence scale: Tellegen et al. 1998) or the
SON-R 5-17 years (Snijders-Oomen Nonverbal intelli-
gence scale—Revised: Snijders et al. 1988).3 This control
















ToM-TB 41.00 (2.83) 42.67 (8.02) 55.75 (7.93) 75.73 (18.23) 71.60 (8.08) 80.80 (7.29) 67.60 (18.23)
VIQ 97.50 (10.61) 95.00 (24.43) 94.25 (14.45) 80.73 (14.53) 94.60 (11.13) 94.40 (11.57) 92.97 (13.48)




35.50 (13.44) 33.00 (13.00) 43.33 (10.69) 45.00 (8.74) 48.00 (1.00) 44.20 (8.17) 43.25 (9.21)
-16.21 (19.91) -27.42 (14.65) -30.70 (12.22) -36.88 (9.87) -43.42 (3.17) -55.89 (9.43) -38.11 (14.18)
Expressive
language
47.50 (9.19) 43.33 (14.19) 73.33 (27.79) 66.00 (19.21) 67.60 (23.83) 68.40 (18.06) 63.75 (20.38)
-4.21 (15.67) -17.08 (11.57) -0.70 (24.49) -15.88 (17.87) -23.82 (21.15) -30.69 (17.30) -17.61 (19.12)
Community 44.00 (7.07) 41.00 (10.82) 63.33 (47.35) 67.60 (20.61) 70.20 (10.03) 74.60 (20.50) 64.32 (19.57)
-7.71 (13.55) -19.42 (8.47) -10.70 (19.71) -14.28 (20.77) -21.22 (6.84) -24.49 (20.94) -17.04 (16.87)
Interpersonal
relationships
32.50 (13.44) 35.33 (15.37) 61.33 (47.35) 50.00 (23.09) 64.80 (22.90) 53.40 (33.63) 51.64 (26.72)
-20.71 (4.83) -26.08 (10.36) -2.37 (38.51) -32.58 (25.87) -26.62 (21.33) -45.69 (35.40) -29.08 (27.15)
Play and
leisure time
19.50 (0.71) 37.00 (14.11) 51.33 (27.06) 47.50 (15.30) 54.60 (11.33) 63.80 (26.53) 48.96 (19.96)
-21.21 (9.78) -23.08 (11.47) -36.03 (17.47) -33.98 (15.35) -36.82 (11.31) -36.29 (16.87) -32.86 (16.33)
Coping skills 38.50 (17.68) 39.33 (10.41) 42.00 (17.35) 53.90 (21.40) 62.20 (11.68) 60.80 (16.72) 52.68 (18.27)
-16.21 (28.40) -14.08 (7.39) -24.70 (28.63) -29.38 (21.90) -29.22 (10.10) -38.29 (17.27) -27.86 (19.17)
Note. VABS: means and standard deviations; every first row depicts VABS interview age equivalent; every second row (in italic) depicts VABS
interview discrepancy score (for each child the discrepancy between the Vineland age equivalent in months and the chronological age in months
was computed for the different subscales)
3 For pragmatic reasons, children with PDD-NOS were tested with
the WISC. The division between verbal IQ and performance IQ can
be very informative in children with autism spectrum disorders. Since
the NT group also consists of children younger than 6 years, the
WISC could not been applied and a nonverbal intelligence test was
preferred.
J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930 1917
123
group was used to explore the relationship between ToM
scores and IQ scores in typically developing children. The
fourth group is a subsample of 106 typically developing
children (drawn from the 324 typically developing children
in Study 1, 3–8 years; 54 boys and 52 girls). For these chil-
dren, VABS questionnaire scores were available. This
control group was used to explore the relationship between
ToM Scores and VABS questionnaire scores in typically
developing children.
Statistical Analyses
With regard to convergent validity, we calculated Pearson
product-moment correlations between the ToM Total score
and the CSBQ subscales, the VABS questionnaire and the
Tom-Test. Divergent validity was tested by comparing the
ToM quotient scores with language scores and IQ scores by
calculating Pearson product-moment correlations.
Results
The ToM scores of children with PDD-NOS are signifi-
cantly lower than those of the matched control children
(ToM total score: M = 67.60, SD = 18.23 versus M
= 77.23, SD = 15.24, p = 0.001, one-tailed; ToM-Q score:
M = 85.10, SD = 21.28 versus M = 101.09, SD = 13.79,
p\ 0.001, one-tailed). They had significantly lower scores
on the mental physical tasks, the belief-action tasks, the
belief-emotion tasks and the desire-action tasks. No sig-
nificant differences were found for the emotion-recognition
tasks and the desire-emotion tasks (see Table 8).
The correlations of the ToM Storybooks with other tests
can be found in Table 9. The correlations of the ToM total
score with the CSBQ subscales in children with PDD-NOS
were negative and significant (p = 0.01, one-tailed): sub-
scale 1 ‘not optimally tuned to the social situation’
(r = -0.26), subscale 2 ‘reduced contact and social inter-
est’(r = -0.26), subscale 3 ‘orientation problems in time,
place, or activity’ (r = -0.60), subscale 4 ‘difficulties in
understanding social information’ (r = -0.47), subscale 5
‘stereotyped behavior’ (r = -0.39), and subscale 6 ‘fear of
and resistance to changes’ (r = -0.41). The lower children
with PDD-NOS scored on the ToM Storybooks, the more
problems they exhibited on the CSBQ-subscales.
The correlations of the ToM Storybooks with the VABS
questionnaire subscores are significant for the IS scale
(r = 0.19 and r = 0.35, for, respectively, typically devel-
oping children and children with PDD-NOS, p = 0.01,
one-tailed) and show a trend for the AS scale (p = 0.06,
one-tailed, for both typically developing children and
children with PDD-NOS). Thus, a higher ToM score
implies higher sociability.
The correlation of the ToM Storybooks with the Tom-
Test is high (M = 47.09, SD = 9.74 versus M = 87.39, SD
= 11.36, scores of, respectively, Tom-Test and ToM Sto-
rybooks, r = 0.79, p \ 0.001, tested two-tailed). Children
with PDD-NOS evidence ToM problems on both the ToM
Storybooks and the Tom test.
The correlation with language comprehension in typi-
cally developing children varies for the different language
tests from 0.43 to 0.47 (p B 0.001, tested two tailed; a
common variance of 18–22%) (see Table 9). Concerning
IQ, in typically developing children only a performance IQ
was obtained. The correlation with ToM-Q was 0.47
(p = 0.001, tested two-tailed; a common variance of 22%);
while in children with PDD-NOS, there was no significant
Table 8 ToM results of
children with PDD-NOS
Note. MC, Monte Carlo
analyses
Control group PDD group Analysis
Total score
Total ToM-score 77.23 (15.24) 67.60 (18.23) MC, p \ 0.001
ToM-Q score 101.09 (13.79) 85.10 (21.28) MC, p \ 0.001
Subscores
Emotion recognition (14) 9.82 (2.62) 9.53 (2.84) ns
Mental physical
Real-mental items (0–24) 16.56 (3.42) 14.43 (3.82) MC, p \ 0.001
Real-imaginary items (0–8) 7.28 (1.15) 6.30 (1.64) MC, p \ 0.001
Close impostors (0–12) 8.81 (2.07) 8.13 (2.78) MC, p = 0.01
Desires
Predicting action (0–5) 3.43 (1.05) 2.83 (1.18) MC, p \ 0.001
Predicting emotion (0–12) 7.94 (3.08) 8.03 (2.62) ns
Beliefs
Predicting action (0–26) 16.31 (6.32) 13.03 (7.01) MC, p \ 0.001
Predicting emotion (0–6) 4.06 (1.43) 3.40 (1.52) MC, p \ 0.001
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correlation with performance IQ (r = 0.07). However, the
correlation of their verbal IQ with ToM-Q was 0.41
(p \ 0.05, tested one-tailed; a common variance of 17%).
Conclusion
The results show that children with PDD-NOS evidence
ToM problems. Children with PDD-NOS have problems
with beliefs, both in predicting behaviors and emotions. In
addition, they have problems on emotion recognition, real-
imaginary, real-mental, close impostor, and desire-action
tasks. These findings largely agree with the findings from
Serra et al. (2002). Despite differences in p-values, the
findings from both studies coincide. The only contrary
finding is that beliefs used to predict actions were signifi-
cantly more difficult for children with PDD-NOS than for
typically developing children, whereas Serra and col-
leagues found the opposite. The finding from the present
study, however, is more consistent with clinical
expectations.
The construct validity of the ToM Storybooks is good,
both for the convergent and the divergent validity. Con-
cerning the convergent validity, substantial correlations
with ToM-related tests were found. The correlations of the
ToM total score with the CSBQ subscales were good.
Average negative correlations were found with all sub-
scales. The highest correlations were found for the subscale
‘difficulties in understanding social information’, which
can be perceived of as related to ToM skills, and for the
subscale ‘orientation problems in time, place, or activity’,
which can be perceived of as related to executive functions.
It is known that executive functions are somehow linked
with ToM development (e.g. Carlson et al. 2002).
The results from the ToM Storybooks also correlated
with the VABS supplementary items from Frith et al.
(1994). We found significant correlations with the IS Scale
(requiring ToM) and a trend for the AS Scale (not requiring
ToM) with the ToM Storybooks, for both the typically
developing group and the PDD-NOS group. Our results
agree to a large extent with the results of Frith et al. (1994),
except that the latter found significant differences for the
AS only in the normal control group and for the IS only in
the autistic group. Purely speculatively, the differences in
results can be due to the restricted use of FB measurements
(Smarties test and Three Boxes test instead of a compre-
hensive ToM test) in a more seriously affected group
(children with an autistic disorder compared to children
with PDD-NOS in our research).
With regard to the convergent validity, the correlation of
the ToM Storybooks with the Tom-Test of Steerneman
et al. (2002) is as expected. The ToM Storybooks test also
has adequate discriminant validity. It can distinguish chil-
dren with a normal ToM development from children with
ToM problems, such as children with PDD-NOS. For
future research, examining the applicability and discrimi-
natory power of the ToM Storybooks, it is recommended to
include children with an autistic disorder and other clinical
groups, like for instance children with ADHD.
Finally, the correlations between children’s scores on
the ToM Storybooks and language acquisition tests are
high ([0.40). Also, correlations with IQ scores were
inspected. The verbal IQ results of the children with PDD-
NOS were somewhat lower than the normal sample, which
is often seen in subsamples of children with autism
(compare Joseph et al. 2002; Kraijer 2004; Siegel et al.
1996). As regards the correlations with IQ scores, our
research showed a significant correlation with PIQ for the
typically developing group (compare Muris et al. 1997,
1999; Carlson et al. 2002), but not for the PDD-NOS
group. The latter group showed significant correlations
with VIQ, consistent with findings of other researchers
(r(230) = 0.43 in typically developing children, p \ 0.001
in Hughes et al. 1999; r(52) = 0.61 in typically developing
children and children with PDD-NOS, p \ 0.001 in Muris
et al. 1999). Final conclusions on the differences between
these two groups cannot be drawn since different IQ tests
were used. Due to the age limitations of IQ tests, different
tests were used for the children with PDD-NOS in com-
parison with typically developing children. Moreover the
PDD-NOS group was much smaller. As concerns future
research on the relationship between IQ and ToM, the
present authors recommend the use of a comprehensive
ToM instrument, as was done in the present study and in
studies of Hughes and colleagues, and Muris and
colleagues.
Correlations between ToM Storybooks and IQ scores
were notably high. However, this is not surprising. One
could say that, if we look at intelligence in a broad way,
comprehensive ToM instruments measure a specific aspect
of intelligence, namely a kind of social intelligence. After
all, these tests look into the logical reasoning of people and
correlations of one type of intelligence with another are
highly common. In addition, intelligence contributes to
acquiring ToM skills, making it possible for children to
understand connections between causes and results. In that
view, comparison with IQ should perhaps not be consid-
ered as a test for divergent validity.
General Discussion
This article presented the construction and validation of the
ToM Storybooks. It is a comprehensive ToM test, mea-
suring different basic ToM components, but also associated
aspects. In Study 1 the construction of this test was dis-
cussed. The test holds 34 tasks, spread over six storybooks.
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A ToM sumscore and a ToM quotient score can be cal-
culated. In Study 2, analyses showed an agreement
between the underlying theoretical constructs and the
components found through component analysis. Study 3
looked into the reliability of the test. Internal consistency,
test–retest reliability and inter-rater reliability were found
good. Lastly, Study 4 assessed the construct validity of the
ToM Storybooks. Convergent validity, based on two
questionnaires and an additional ToM test, was good. The
ToM-score had high correlations with language tests and
IQ tests, as was expected.
It can be concluded that the validity and reliability of the
ToM Storybooks complies with the requirements of an
instrument of this sort. The separate findings are consistent
with findings of other researches, but also agree with the
more general findings of Wellman and colleagues on FB
tasks (2001), which show that researchers can vary the
tasks over an extended set of possibilities without influ-
encing the performance of children. There is no indication
that the medium in which ToM tasks is presented, in this
case pictured storybooks, has affected the results in ways
that reduce the test’s reliability.
A Critical Remark
The reliance of this kind of task on language comprehen-
sion with this kind of population, may lead to potential
complications. Children with weak language comprehen-
sion undoubtedly will have more problems with
successfully completing the test. The literature shows that
there are strong relationships between language and ToM
(Astington and Baird 2004; Astington and Jenkins 1999; de
Villiers 2000; Tager-Flusberg 2000). In addition, many
children with autism have language problems. In people
with autism, ToM results are correlated to verbal mental
age (Frith et al. 1991; Prior et al. 1990) and verbal skills
(Happe´ 1995). However, early research has shown that
language problems do not contribute to mental state
impairment, because children with for instance semantic
language impairment do not show such problems (Leslie
and Frith 1988; Perner et al. 1989). On the other hand, the
influence of language on ToM development should not be
underestimated (Ruffman et al. 2003; Sparrevohn and
Howie 1995), also in testing. Language is a medium
through which children learn about beliefs (Astington
2001). Reading storybooks, for instance, form a rich source
of mentalizing information for children (Dyer et al. 2000).
Potentialities of the ToM Storybooks
The test includes a wider range of ToM aspects commonly
tested. It includes not only tasks on first-order beliefs and
desires, but also tasks on associated aspects such as the
distinction between mental and physical entities. It is a
comprehensive test consisting of tasks with different
developmental challenges. The primary advantage of this
test over existing batteries is that it targets skills that develop
in typically developing children prior to the age of five, and
further refine and increase during the early school years. The
test, however, is applicable beyond the age of five; it has
norm scores up to the age of 12 years and thus allows for
comparisons between children of widely varying age, which
makes it particularly appropriate for comparison with clini-
cal groups in which ToM development is delayed. As a
consequence, this test may have potential for a range of
applications to both fundamental and applied work. More-
over, since this study covers a wider age range than is
normally included in ToM research, valid comparisons
between older children with ToM problems and their age
mates with normal ToM functioning can be made. We like to
remark that the older age group included in this study is not
intended for discrimination between typically developing
children, but between older children with clinical diagnosis.
Since older typically developing children have, as a group, a
smaller range in ToM total scores, a lower ToM score on
these simple ToM tasks is very informative. Because of the
use of simple ToM tasks and a motivating storyline, the test
might also be useful in the field of intellectual disability,
where autism spectrum disorders and related ToM problems
are common. However, for future research it is advisable to
include more complicated ToM tasks, such as a second-order
belief task (see for instance Hughes et al. 2000) and a ‘faux
pas’ task (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999), so that older children
with more subtle problems can also be detected.
The test–retest correlations of the typically developing
children suggested a small learning effect. As stated before,
this is consistent with findings from Muris et al. (1999).
Grigorenko and Sternberg (1998) recommended that this
effect—the learning potential of individual children—be
included in normal diagnostics. In that case, the pretest–
posttest difference can eventually be considered an esti-
mation of learning abilities that are, at least in part, ToM
specific. The absence of a comparable learning effect in
specific groups of children, like we have found in children
with PDD-NOS, could provide interesting information
about the nature of ToM abilities in such children. In this
line, further research on ToM might profit from dynamic
testing—as opposed to static testing—where the learning
potential of a child is quantified on the basis of his or her
understanding and use of feedback given during testing
(Grigorenko and Sternberg 1998). Dynamic indexes can
represent a quality step-up compared with static indexes
(Fabio 2005).
To conclude, one of the methodological strengths of the
current test is that it has extended the limitations common in
the majority of the researches done in the field of ToM.
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Most research has been undertaken in young children only
(mostly up to 6 years, with a major focus on 3–4 year olds),
has used only a few tasks (FB tasks, mainly single tasks)
and considered small research groups (exceptions in the
latter can be found in Charman et al. 2002; Hughes et al.
1999). The present research, aimed at constructing a new
ToM Storybooks, used a wide range of tasks (not only FB
tasks) and consisted of a substantial number of children over
a wide age range. The test not only allows for comparisons
on the basis of raw scores but standardized norms and norm
scores are also available (Blijd-Hoogewys et al. submitted).
In our opinion, the ToM Storybooks provide a compre-
hensive, valid and reliable instrument for researchers and
clinicians who wish to measure Theory-of-Mind in young
typically developing children, as well as children with an
autism spectrum disorder from a broader age range.
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Appendix A: The Theory of Mind Storybooks: Example
Tasks
Before beginning the test, the child is presented with
drawings of five facial expressions (happy, scared, angry,
sad, and surprised); there was also a neutral (just OK) face.
The child was asked to provide labels with the faces in
order to be sure that he/she recognized each emotional
expression (see also Hadwin et al. 1996). If the child did
not know or made a mistake, the experimenter gave the
appropriate label. After practicing the emotions, the actual
test begins.
There are 34 tasks (also see Appendix B); they can be
divided in five groups.
Emotion Recognition (Maximum of 14 Points)
There are five emotion recognition tasks: happy, scared,
angry, sad and surprised. The child is presented with five
situational descriptions. It has to choose the appropriate
face and provide the correct emotion label. To avoid a
response bias, the presentation order of the faces varied.
Example task (see Fig. 1): ‘Sam has won shooting
marbles. He has won the most beautiful marble.’ Ques-
tions: (1) Choose the face that matches. (emotion
recognition), (2) How does he look? (emotion naming), (3)
How come Sam is feeling happy?
The Difference Between Physical and Mental Entities
Mental–Physical Distinction (Maximum of 24 Points)
Pairs of real-mental contrasts are used in which the child has
to compare two characters that have corresponding objec-
tive and subjective experiences. The child has to compare
real situations with pretending, dreaming, thinking about
things, and remembering things. The (justification) ques-
tions and item sequence were counterbalanced.
Example task (see Fig. 2): ‘Sam, mummy and Sparky are
going to the park. First, they are going to the pond. Sam
gives bread to the ducks. And then mummy too. Sam’s
Fig. 1 Emotion recognition
task
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friend, John, can’t go to the park today. John is sick and is
lying in bed at home. John pretends to give bread to the
ducks.’ Questions: (1) Who can really see the bread with
his eyes? John or Sam? (mental physical senses), (2) How
come... [Sam/John] can really see the bread with his eyes?
(3) Who can really give the bread to the ducks now? John
or Sam? (4) John plays. He pretends to feed the ducks. Can
the mummy of John really give that bread to the ducks too?
(mental physical others), (5) Who cannot save the bread
now and give it to the ducks tomorrow? John or Sam?
(mental physical future).
Real–Imaginary Distinction (Maximum of 8 Points)
Questions are asked about real items and imaginary, non-
existing items.
Example task: ‘John and Sam are eating their sand-
wiches. ‘John’, says Sam, ‘Listen. I know a fun game. I am
going to ask you strange questions.’ Questions: (1) Do
yellow bananas exist? (2) Do dancing bananas exist? (3)
Can you think of yellow bananas? (4) Can you think of
dancing bananas?
Close Impostors (Maximum of 12 Points)
Close impostors are physical objects that do not posses all
characteristics of real objects. Real physical objects, like
for instance chairs, have three characteristics, namely
behavioral-sensory evidence, public existence and consis-
tent existence. Close impostors can only be perceived in
one modality and cannot be touched or acted upon. There
are two tasks: one task is on smoke, the other is on a nasty
smell.
Example task (see Fig. 3): ‘Sparky, the dog, is rolling in
the mud. ‘Yak Sparky, you smell bad’, says Sam. ‘It stinks!’
Questions: Can Sam touch the smell with his hands? Can
Sam smell the smell? (close impostor senses) Can mummy
smell it too? (close impostor others) How come mummy
can smell it... [too/not]? Can Sam save the smell in a box
and smell it again tomorrow?(close impostor future).
Perception Knowledge (Maximum of 3 Points)
Only one task is involved. Questions are asked about the
connection of seeing or not seeing something and knowing
or consequently not knowing something (a subtest that was
also included in the batteries of Tager-Flusberg 2003).
Example task (see Fig. 4): ‘Today, it is Sam’s birthday.
He is five. In the room there are two gifts on the table: a
little parcel and a big box. Lisa, his sister, is allowed to
look in the box, Sam however, can only touch the box’.
Questions: (1) Who knows what is in the box? Sam or Lisa?
2) Why does...[Lisa/Sam] know what is in the box?
Fig. 2 Mental-physical
distinction task
Fig. 3 Close impostor task
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Desires (Maximum of 17 Points)
The knowledge of desires allows one to predict both
emotions and actions. Both sorts of tasks are incorporated
into test items where desires are either fulfilled or not
fulfilled.
There are five tasks on desire-emotions (wanting and
getting/not getting/getting something else, and not wanting
and not getting/ getting).
Example task: ‘Come along Sam and Sparky’, says
mother, ‘we are going home.’ On the way home, Sam sees
the ice cream man. He wants an ice cream. ‘Mother, can I
have an ice cream?’, he asks. ‘Off course’, says mother and
Sam gets a great ice cream.’ Questions: (1) Choose the
face that matches. (desire emotion recognition), (2) How
does he look?(desire emotion naming), (3) How come Sam
is feeling...[emotion]?
There are three desire-action tasks. Example task: ‘They
are at John’s house. But John has hidden himself. Sam
wants to go swimming and John has to come along to the
Fig. 4 Seeing leads to knowing task
Fig. 5 False belief task
1924 J Autism Dev Disord (2008) 38:1907–1930
123
swimming pool. He goes to look for Sam in the cellar. He
opens the door. And yes! There is John.’ Questions: (1)
What will Sam do now? (2) Why is he going...[repeat
previous answer]?
Beliefs (Maximum of 34 Points)
Questions are asked about fulfilled or not fulfilled beliefs.
These tasks, like desire tasks, can be used to predict both
emotions and actions.
There are two belief-emotion tasks. Example task: ‘Sam
thinks his swimming trunks are on the chair. Sam goes to
look on the chair. But there he finds a chicken!’ Question:
(1) Choose the face that matches. (standard belief emotion
recognition), (2) How does he look? (standard belief emo-
tion naming), (3) How come Sam is feeling...[emotion]?
There are eight belief-action tasks. They are all first-
order belief tasks: on standard belief, changed belief,
inferred belief, inferred belief control, not belief, not own
belief (or diverse-belief), explicit FB and FB (change-of-
location, see figure below) tasks.
Example task (see Fig. 5): ‘Grandpa and grandma are
paying Sam a visit. Sam gets rollerblades from grandpa
and grandma. He’s very happy with the present. Sam puts
the rollerblades in the toy trunk. Then, he goes upstairs.
When Sam has left, his sister Lisa goes to the toy trunk. She
likes to tease her brother. Lisa hides the rollerblades in the
box! And then, she goes outside. Then, Sam comes back. He
wants to rollerblade.’ Questions: (1) Where will Sam look
for his rollerblades? (2) Why is Sam looking...[there]? (3)
Where does Sam think his rollerblades are? (4) Where are
they really?
Appendix B: Order of the Tasks in the ToM Storybooks
Book Task Scoring of justificationa
No Name Type Quest.b Maxc 1 point 2 points
How is Sam feeling? 1 Emotion recognition Happy 2 (1) 4 RM, GK and S D, FB and VB
2 Emotion recognition Angry 2 (1) 4 RM, GK and S D, FB and VB
3 Emotion recognition Scared 2 2
4 Emotion recognition Sad 2 2
5 Emotion recognition Surprised 2 2
Sam goes to the park 6 Standard belief Action 1 (1) 3 VRB FB
7 Standard belief Emotion 2 2
8 Real-mental distinction Pretend 4 (1) 6 LP RR
9 Desire Action 1 1
10 Close impostor Smell 4 (1) 6 IPP-almost IPP and LP
11 Desire Emotion 2 (1) 4 VB, LP and S D and RM
Sam goes swimming 12 Standard belief Action 1 1
13 Standard belief Emotion 2 (1) 4 LP, PC and S FB and VB
14 Desire Action 1 (1) 3 RM and S D
15 Real-mental distinction Dream 4 (1) 6 LP RR
16 Desire Emotion 2 2
17 Real imaginary distinction Think 4 4
Sam visits his grandparents 18 Desire Action 1 1
19 Explicit false belief Action 2 (1) 4 VRB FB
20 Close impostor Smoke 4 (1) 6 IPP-almost IPP
21 Not own belief Action 1 (1) 3 VRB FB
22 Desire Emotion 2 2
23 Real-mental distinction Think 4 (1) 6 S RR and LP
Sam at the farm 24 Standard belief Action 1 1
25 Changed belief Action 1 (1) 3 S FB
26 Real-mental distinction Remember 4 (1) 6 LP RR
27 Not belief Action 2 (1) 4 VRB FB
28 Desire Emotion 2 2
29 Real imaginary distinction Dream 4 4
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Appendix C: Overview of Justification Categories4
In order to evaluate the justifications of children, we for-
mulated 21 categories.
Desire: The answer refers to the protagonist’s desire
with respect to the situation. It involves wanting or desiring
something. Ex. Why is Sam happy? Because he wanted
that ice cream.
Fact belief: The child refers to the protagonist’s
knowledge. It involves thinking, knowing, being sure of,
expecting or recognizing. Ex. Why does Sam look for
grandpa there? Because he thinks that is where grandpa is
sitting.
Value belief: Answers to these questions pass a value
judgement on how the protagonist handles a situation. It
involves verbs such as loves, dares, liking something, or
finding it sad.
Changed fact belief: The answer refers to a revised
belief on the part of the protagonist. This category is only
used for the changed fact belief task. Ex. Why does Sam
look for the chickens in the coop? Because he now thinks
the chickens are in the coop (At first, he thought they were
in the field).
Insight physical processes: The child gives an expla-
nation of the working of a physical process. This category is
only used for the close impostor task. Ex. How come Sam
can’t save smoke in a box and look at it again tomorrow?
Because smoke goes up in the air. It evaporates.
Reality status: The child explains the reality of a sub-
ject or object. Ex. How come Sam can see the ducks?
Because he is really feeding the ducks. His friend is only
pretending.
Perception criterion: The child refers to a reality cri-
terion: the use of senses (hearing, seeing, smelling) by the
protagonist. Ex. How come Sam can see the bread with his
own eyes? Because he is looking at it.
Verb referring to belief: Answers in which the verb say
or tell is used instead of think. It is understood that saying
is like thinking aloud and thus indicates belief. Ex. Why
did Sam went looking there? Because he said he would
(Note: In the text it is explicitly mentioned that Sam thinks
they are there.).
Location possession explanation: The child very
clearly refers to the location or someone’s possession of an
object (as specified in the question), without referring to
the mental state of the protagonist. Ex. How come the
swimmer can see the ball? Because he swims next to Sam
(who is holding the ball).
Mental state-verbs not otherwise specified: These
constitute of verbs referring to mental states, but don’t fall
under categories ‘desire’, ‘fact belief’, ‘value belief’,
‘changed fact belief’ or ‘verbs which refer to a belief’.
They are: looking forward to, counting on, being afraid
that, being happy with, being anxious about, hoping for,
liking, finding sad that, being curious about, wondering
about, must, may, having intention to, planning, is going to.
Situational: Dwelling on the situation without reference
to the mental state of the protagonist. Ex. Why does Sam
look embarrassed? Because his swimsuit is missing.
General knowledge reference: The child refers
explicitly to a normality or logicality. Ex. Why does Sam
look for his grandfather behind the door? Because grand-
fathers he cannot be under the table; grandfathers find it
difficult to crawl under tables.
External characteristic of subject/object: The child
explains the exterior characteristics of a person or object.
Ex. How come Sam can see the bread? Because he has
eyes.
Own reference frame with mental state: In these sit-
uations the child describes a mental state, giving an answer
in the form of a belief or desire (think, know, like, want,
dare etc), or that an emotion is involved in the answer.
Appendix B continued
Book Task Scoring of justificationa
No Name Type Quest.b Maxc 1 point 2 points
Sam’s birthday 30 Perception knowledge Know 1 (1) 3 LP PC
31 Desire Emotion 2 2
32 Inferred belief control Action 3 0
33 False belief Action 3 (1) 5 LP and S FB
34 Inferred belief Action 2 2
a Correct justification answers per task: D = desire, FB = fact belief, GK = general knowledge, IPP = insight physical process, LP = location
possession, PC = perception criterion, RM = rest category mental state, RR = referring to reality, S = situational, VB = value belief,
VRB = verb referring to a belief; b Number of test questions, and between brackets the number of additional justification questions; c Maximum
attainable points
4 The explanations are translated from Dutch examples. It is not
unthinkable that there are nuances in English that we could not
explain here.
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However, this answer refers to the child himself; how he/
she would react in the same situation. Or the child gives an
own interpretation of the situation and makes up things
which (indirectly) relate to the context of the question, but
goes too far.
Own reference frame without mental state: This
answer is similar to the former one, but without using a
mental state.
Reiteration of question: When the answer is a repeti-
tion of an emotion or action from the question. This doesn’t
have to be a literal repetition. Ex. Why does Sam look
happy? Because he is happy.
Irrelevant/uninterpretable: This answer is a nonsense
answer; it has nothing to do with the question and is thus
neither an explanation nor an answer to the question. Ex.
How come Sam looks for the chickens in the coop?
Because I think that Teletubbies go looking there.
Doesn’t know: When a child says he/she does not know
the answer.
Doesn’t say: When a child is silent; he/she gives no
answer.
Missing: The answer is unreadable or inaudible.
Not applicable: When a question was accidently not
asked.
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